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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
This case raises the question of whether a federal inmate can be foreclosed
from using habeas corpus to obtain post-conviction relief from an unconstitutional
sentence by the gatekeeping provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Amicus is an Associate
Professor of Law at Washington and Lee School of Law and a scholar of civil rights
who has studied and written about the availability of remedies for unlawful sentences
provided by the writ of habeas corpus and § 2255. Amicus has a professional interest
in the sound development of the habeas corpus doctrine and ensuring this Court is
fully and accurately informed about the issues raised by this proceeding, particularly
as they relate to application of the Suspension Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Amicus is expressing his own views, and not any views of his institution.
STATEMENTS REQUIRED BY FED. R. APP. P. 29
All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Amicus certifies that no
party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, no party or party’s counsel
contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief, and
no person other than amicus curiae and his counsel contributed money that was
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case goes to the heart of the integrity, fairness, and credibility of our
criminal legal system. Jason Bell should be a free man today. Instead, he is serving
1
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a 274-month sentence under the residual clause of the mandatory career offender
guideline, even though an identically worded residual clause was declared
unconstitutionally vague by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S.
591 (2015), a decision given retroactive effect in cases on collateral review in Welch
v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016). Mr. Bell is seeking post-conviction relief
through the writ of habeas corpus to correct what is undoubtedly an illegal sentence.
See Welch, 578 U.S. at 134 (“[A] court lacks the power to exact a penalty that has
not been authorized by any valid criminal statute.”).
The Framers of the Constitution considered the writ of habeas corpus “a vital
instrument for the protection of individual liberty.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 743 (2008). The privilege of habeas corpus “entitles [a] prisoner to a meaningful
opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous
application or interpretation’ of relevant law.” Id. at 728–29 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)). The Framers protected the privilege of habeas corpus
through the Suspension Clause of the Constitution: “The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus Shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2
In 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Congress created a substitute procedure for federal
prisoners seeking habeas review of their detention. However, § 2255’s
“gatekeeping” provisions can operate to deprive the courts of jurisdiction to hear
2
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prisoners’ petitions for relief. Congress therefore included in § 2255 a “savings
clause” designed to ensure the statute’s procedural requirements do not violate the
Suspension Clause. The savings clause permits a federal prisoner to file a petition
for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if it “appears that the [§ 2255]
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
This Court has appropriately interpreted § 2255’s savings clause to allow
federal prisoners to pursue habeas claims under § 2241 to challenge unlawful
sentences when such challenges would otherwise be precluded by § 2255. See, e.g.,
Young v. Antonelli, 982 F.3d 914 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d
415 (4th Cir. 2018). However, this Court has also said the savings clause
encompasses only “limited circumstances,” In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir.
2000), and “should provide only the tightest alleyway to relief,” Lester v. Flournoy,
909 F.3d 708, 716 (4th Cir. 2018). The Court’s precedents provide a clear avenue
for granting relief in this case. Nevertheless, if Mr. Bell cannot proceed with a § 2241
petition under the savings clause, § 2255 would be precluding a prisoner from
exercising “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant
to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law,” Boumediene, 553
U.S. at 728–29 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302), in violation of the Suspension
Clause.
3
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Suspension Clause Guarantees Federal Prisoners Such As Mr. Bell
A Meaningful Opportunity To Challenge An Unconstitutional Sentence.
The core question raised by this case is whether a federal prisoner serving an

unconstitutional sentence can be foreclosed from post-conviction habeas relief by
the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255. The Constitution answers that question in the
negative through the Suspension Clause. “[F]reedom from unlawful restraint [i]s a
fundamental precept of liberty,” and the writ of habeas corpus “a vital instrument to
secure that freedom.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739. The importance of the common
law writ was such that the Framers specified that it could be suspended only in the
most exigent circumstances. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also Boumediene, 553
U.S. at 739, 743; Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due
Process, and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American
Constitutionalism, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1361, 1370–72 (2010) (citing 2 The Records of
The Federal Convention of 1787, at 438 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)). If
§ 2255’s gatekeeping provisions preclude Mr. Bell’s use of the statutory habeas
substitute and § 2255’s savings clause does not provide an avenue for habeas relief
in this case, then the statute would violate the Suspension Clause.
As discussed below, Mr. Bell’s pursuit of post-conviction habeas relief for his
unconstitutional sentence is consistent with the historic use of habeas corpus in
England and the United States. Further, the availability of habeas corpus to challenge
4
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unconstitutional sentences such as Mr. Bell’s protects critical principles of
separation of powers and due process set forth in the Constitution. Any statute that
precluded Mr. Bell and similarly situated prisoners from pursuing habeas relief
would suspend the writ of habeas corpus in violation of the Suspension Clause.
A.

Habeas Corpus Has Been Available For Post-Conviction
Challenges To Unlawful Federal Sentences Since Our Nation’s
Founding.

Whether the nature of the writ of habeas corpus protected by the Suspension
Clause should be defined by the common-law habeas protections available as of
1789 or by the writ as it has continued to evolve in the common-law tradition is a
subject of ongoing debate. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 (“The Court has been
careful not to foreclose the possibility that the protections of the Suspension Clause
expanded along with post-1789 developments that define the present scope of the
writ.”). However, Mr. Bell’s effort to challenge his unconstitutional sentence fits
comfortably within the historic scope of the writ, which provided a means of seeking
post-conviction review of constitutional claims alleging unlawful detention.
Prior to the creation of the American judicial system, common-law habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum—the “Great Writ”—applied to detention challenges of all
kinds. Blackstone described habeas as the “great and efficacious writ, in all manner
of illegal confinement.” 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England, Ch. 8, at 131 (1765). Chief Justice Coke observed in his Institutes that “‘if
5

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6189

Doc: 19-1

Filed: 06/21/2022

Pg: 12 of 32

a man be taken, or committed to prison contra legem terrae, against the Law of the
land,’ then ‘[h]e may have an habeas corpus.’” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1984 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing The
Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 55 (6th ed. 1681)).
In the American judicial system, the Supreme Court “started reviewing postconviction constitutional claims under Congress’s first grant of habeas authority,
included in the Judiciary Act of 1789.” Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1531
(2022) (Kagan, J., dissenting). The Act did not specifically provide for collateral
review of constitutional claims, but “the Court in the mid-19th century invoked the
habeas law to adjudicate [post-conviction constitutional] claims—including some
from petitioners already convicted and sentenced.” Id. at 1532. For example, in Ex
parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307, 309–15 (1855), the Supreme Court scrutinized the merits
of the petitioner’s claim in detail before deciding that no constitutional violation
occurred and the petitioner should remain in prison. In Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163,
178 (1873), the Supreme Court, acting under the original habeas law, granted a
federal prisoner habeas relief after finding a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, explaining it was carrying out a “sacred duty” in declaring that the prisoner
was being held “without authority.”
After the Civil War, Congress amended the Judicial Act to expressly provide
for review of constitutional claims, and “[f]rom the mid-1800s on, federal courts
6
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granted habeas writs to prisoners, federal and state alike, who on the way to
conviction or sentence had suffered serious constitutional harms.” Davenport, 142
S. Ct. at 1534 (Kagan, J., dissenting). For example, in Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S.
417, 420–21 (1885), the Supreme Court explained that habeas review was
appropriate when a prisoner’s “sentence exceeds the jurisdiction of that court, or
there is no authority to hold him under the sentence.” And to remove any doubt, Ex
parte Nielsen confirmed that habeas relief was available to remedy unconstitutional
sentences. 131 U.S. 176, 185 (1889) (“In the present case the sentence was given
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, because it was against an express provision of
the constitution which bounds and limits all jurisdiction.”).1
Mr. Bell’s effort to challenge his unconstitutional sentence fits squarely within
the traditional English and early American use of habeas to determine whether a
prisoner was being held “without authority.” Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. at 178; see

1

At this time, unconstitutional sentences were considered sentences issued in excess
of a court’s “jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. at 185; Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 377 (1879) (“[I]f the laws are unconstitutional and void, the
Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the causes. Its authority to indict and try the
petitioners arose solely upon these laws.”); see also Davenport, 142 S. Ct. at 1533
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The concept of ‘jurisdictional defects’ could [during the
19th and 20th centuries] include—rather than contrast with—constitutional
errors . . . .”); Jonathan R. Siegel, Habeas, History, and Hermeneutics, 64 Ariz. L.
Rev. 505, 528 (2022) (“A nineteenth-century habeas court might also hold that a
sentencing court lacked ‘jurisdiction’ and that habeas relief could be awarded
because there was a constitutional defect in the procedure by which the sentencing
court tried the petitioner.”); Leah M. Litman, The Myth of the Great Writ, 100 Tex.
L. Rev. 219, 260 (2021) (explaining that while early habeas cases “purported to
focus on jurisdiction, that focus allowed courts to determine the rules about what
made a detention lawful”).
7
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also Welch, 578 U.S. at 134 (“[A] court lacks the power to exact a penalty that has
not been authorized by any valid criminal statute.”).
In addition, arguments that the Framers intended the Suspension Clause to
protect only the writ of habeas corpus as it was applied in 1789 wrongly suggest the
Framers failed to recognize the writ itself had evolved, and would continue to evolve,
over time in the common-law tradition. Through the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, English and American courts understood habeas as an equitable remedy
and embraced the flexibility of the writ, using habeas’ broad reach to remedy a
variety of legal failures. See Amanda L. Tyler, A “Second Magna Carta”: The
English Habeas Corpus Act and the Statutory Origins of the Habeas Privilege, 91
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1949, 1970–81 (2016); Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White,
The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American
Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 610–13 (2008). English courts “[took] the lead in
developing habeas corpus jurisprudence right up to 1787,” as they expanded
application of the writ “to new questions as they continued to exercise the king’s
prerogative to protect the subject’s liberty.” Halliday & White, supra, at 612–13.
When the Framers protected the writ of habeas corpus in the Suspension Clause,
“they did so against the backdrop of an English history of habeas corpus, which
included two centuries of judicial innovation in habeas corpus jurisprudence.” Id. at
670; see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (“Indeed, common-law habeas-corpus
8
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was, above all, an adaptable remedy. Its precise application and scope change[]
depending upon the circumstances.”). Thus, in looking to the Founders’ intent, the
Suspension Clause still should be interpreted to protect the use of habeas corpus to
challenge unlawful sentences as habeas evolved and the Supreme Court granted
habeas relief, “on an assortment of constitutional grounds, to both federal and state
prisoners challenging their convictions or sentences.” Davenport, 142 S. Ct. at 1532
(Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973)
(“[O]ver the years, the writ of habeas corpus evolved as a remedy available to effect
discharge from any confinement contrary to the Constitution or fundamental
law . . . .”).
In sum, Mr. Bell plainly could have used the writ of habeas corpus to
challenge the legality of his sentence but for Congress’s enactment of the
gatekeeping provisions of § 2255.
B.

Habeas Corpus Must Be Available For Post-Conviction Challenges
To Unlawful Federal Sentences To Protect Separation Of Powers
And Due Process Principles.

Supreme Court “case law does not contain extensive discussion of standards
defining suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 773.
However, the Court has recognized that the writ’s role in “the system conceived by
the Framers . . . must inform proper interpretation of the Suspension Clause.” Id. at
739. In other words, the Suspension Clause is designed to protect habeas corpus, so
9
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it should be understood to demand, “at a minimum, the availability of habeas corpus
relief to address federal detention when it violates the very doctrinal underpinnings
of habeas review.” McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d
1076, 1122 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).2 Habeas review
finds its doctrinal underpinnings in separation of powers and due process principles.
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742–44; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554–58
(Scalia, J., dissenting). A detention that violates either principle necessarily tramples
on the foundations of habeas review and demands the availability of habeas to
provide relief. Mr. Bell’s detention pursuant to an unconstitutional sentence presents
separation of powers and due process concerns that demand the availability of
habeas.
1.

Mr. Bell’s challenge to his unconstitutional sentence
implicates fundamental separation of powers principles.

As the Supreme Court has recognized, “the Framers deemed the writ to be an
essential mechanism in the separation-of-powers scheme” designed to “preserve[]
limited government.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743–44 (citing The Federalist No. 84
(Alexander Hamilton)). The courts’ authority to consider petitions for habeas relief
derives from “freedom’s first principles,” including “freedom from arbitrary and

2

In Wheeler, the Fourth Circuit explicitly declined to follow the McCarthan
majority, noting that decision was contrary to similar and long-standing Fourth
Circuit law. 886 F.3d at 433–34.
10

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6189

Doc: 19-1

Filed: 06/21/2022

Pg: 17 of 32

unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the
separation of powers.” Id. at 797. By guaranteeing the writ’s availability, the
Suspension Clause “protects the rights of the detained by a means consistent with
the essential design of the Constitution . . . to maintain the delicate balance of
governance that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.” Id. at 745 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Properly understood, the Suspension Clause demands consideration
of “claims raising challenges that a sentence was imposed in excess of a government
branch’s valid powers.” McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1134 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
The writ of habeas corpus protects the Constitution’s separation of powers
and limited government principles by providing a detainee a judicial forum to
challenge detention in several contexts. Habeas cases often involve prisoners
seeking relief when they have been subjected to an unlawful sentence because a court
misinterpreted a statute. In such cases, habeas protects the basic design of our
constitutional system under which “defining crimes and fixing penalties are
legislative, not judicial, functions.” United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486
(1948). Consistent with the principle of separation of powers, a person has a
“constitutional right to be deprived of liberty as a punishment for criminal conduct
only to the extent authorized by Congress.” Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684,
690 (1980); see also Welch, 578 U.S. at 134 (“[T]he separation of powers prohibits
a court from imposing criminal punishment beyond what Congress meant to
11
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enact.”). The writ of habeas corpus must be available to allow prisoners to challenge
detention when a sentencing court supplants the role of Congress.
Mr. Bell’s case presents a different but equally important issue implicating
the Constitution’s separation of powers and limited government principles:
Congress, acting through the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, forced the judiciary
to impose a sentence based on a statutory provision that is unconstitutionally vague.
Allowing a prisoner detained under an unconstitutional sentence to seek habeas
relief preserves the basic role of the judiciary to say where the legislature has
overstepped the boundaries set forth in the Constitution. Congress’s role is to define
crimes and fix penalties, but the “courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury
v. Madison, to determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the
Constitution.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); accord id. at 524
(“The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the
Judiciary.”). The duty to say what the law is, including what the Constitution means,
represents one of the core functions of the Judicial Branch, reserved to it by the
Constitution. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
A statute that prevented courts from using habeas to correct unconstitutional
sentences would substantially undermine the separation of powers and limited
government principles enshrined in the Constitution. Habeas “accomplishes [its]
crucial function by requiring consideration of claims where a prisoner tests the
12
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legality of his imprisonment on the basis that, in jailing him, at least one of the
branches of government violated the separation of powers . . . by exceeding its
constitutional powers.” McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1134 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting);
see also Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause,
125 Harv. L. Rev. 901, 972 (2012) (explaining that habeas was understood by the
Framers as one of the “‘bulwarks of civil and political liberties’ to be guarded with
‘an unceasing jealousy’” (quoting 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States § 1773, at 652) (citing 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries, at
133) (alterations omitted)). A statute that prevented the writ from serving its basic
function would shift power to the legislature at the expense of the judiciary, contrary
to the Constitution’s design. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988)
(“[T]he system of separated powers and checks and balances established in the
Constitution was regarded by the Framers as ‘a self-executing safeguard against the
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.’”
(citation omitted)). The writ of habeas corpus must remain available to allow courts
to consider claims revealing that Congress exceeded its constitutional powers.
2.

Mr. Bell’s challenge to his unconstitutional sentence
implicates fundamental due process principles.

The writ of habeas corpus also plays a critical role in securing the
Constitution’s guarantee of due process. The Framers were determined to
constitutionalize protections against arbitrary detentions to protect fundamental
13
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precepts of liberty. They did so by constitutionalizing due process of law in the Fifth
Amendment and habeas corpus through the Suspension Clause. See Amanda L.
Tyler, Is Suspension A Political Question?, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 333, 383–84 (2006)
(“[A]t its most fundamental and as it relates to the Great Writ, the guarantee of due
process promises that the Executive must answer to an impartial body with a valid
cause for depriving one of his or her liberty.”). The Due Process Clause and the
Suspension Clause work together to secure the fundamental idea, derived from the
Magna Carta, that no man should be imprisoned contrary to the law of the land: the
Due Process Clause provides the right against unlawful detention, and habeas corpus
is “the instrument by which due process could be insisted upon by a citizen illegally
imprisoned.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 555–56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
This Court has recognized that habeas should be available when “an arbitrary
disregard of the petitioner’s right to liberty is a denial of due process of law.”
Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 431–32 (quoting Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346
(1980)); see also Lester, 909 F.3d at 713 (discussing Wheeler and Hicks). In Hicks,
the Supreme Court found a due process violation where a defendant was deprived of
his “substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only
to the extent determined by [a] jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion.” 447
U.S. at 346. In Wheeler, this Court identified due process concerns where a habeas
petitioner was sentenced under an erroneous statutory enhancement that prevented
14
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the district judge from exercising the proper range of his sentencing discretion. See
Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 430–32.
Mr. Bell’s situation presents an even sharper case of an unlawful sentence that
undermines the fundamental liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause.
Mr. Bell surely had a substantial and legitimate expectation that he would not be
subjected to an unconstitutionally enhanced sentence. Yet he is now continuing to
serve a 274-month sentence, well beyond the 176 to 199-month guideline range that
would have applied absent the constitutional error. See App. Op. Br. 18–19. Such
sentencing errors that alter the ceiling or floor of the range prescribed by Congress
are fundamental defects that the savings clause is designed to prevent. See Brandon
Hasbrouck, Saving Justice: Why Sentencing Errors Fall Within the Savings Clause,
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), 108 Geo. L.J. 287, 313–23 (2019); see also United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447–49 (1972) (upholding decision vacating sentence based
on prior convictions that were later ruled constitutionally invalid).
A statute that prevented courts from using habeas to correct unconstitutional
sentences would substantially undermine the due process principles enshrined in the
Constitution. The fundamental right to freedom from unlawful restraint protected by
the Due Process Clause depends on the protection provided by the writ. See Wheeler,
886 F.3d at 430 (explaining that an unlawful sentence implicates “due process rights
fundamental to our justice system”). Mr. Bell is imprisoned contrary to the law of
15
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the land, contrary to the promise of the Constitution. The writ of habeas corpus must
remain available to allow courts to consider claims that a prisoner is serving a
sentence exceeding what would be legitimately expected absent a violation of the
Constitution or other applicable law. Otherwise, a prisoner could be “held pursuant
to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.” Boumediene, 553
U.S. at 743 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302).
II.

Mr. Bell Will Be Denied The Meaningful Opportunity To Challenge His
Unconstitutional Sentence Guaranteed By The Suspension Clause Unless
The Court Allows Him To Proceed With A § 2241 Petition Under § 2255’s
Savings Clause.
The Suspension Clause “secure[s] the writ [of habeas corpus] and ensures its

place in our legal system.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740. In enacting § 2255,
Congress created a statue that “replaced traditional habeas corpus for federal
prisoners (at least in the first instance) with a process that allowed the prisoner to
file a motion with the sentencing court on the ground that his sentence was, inter
alia, ‘imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States.’” Id.
at 774–75 (quoting United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 207 n.1 (1952)). This
Court should conclude that § 2255’s savings clause allows Mr. Bell to pursue habeas
relief for his claim under § 2241. Reliance on § 2255’s savings clause would be
consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting § 2255 and this Court’s precedent
interpreting the savings clause. However, if this Court were to conclude that
§ 2255’s gatekeeping provisions preclude Mr. Bell’s use of the statutory habeas
16
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substitute and § 2255’s savings clause does not provide an avenue for Mr. Bell to
pursue habeas relief, then it would also have to conclude that § 2255 violates the
Suspension Clause.
A.

Congress Did Not Intend § 2255 To Restrict Access To The Writ
Of Habeas Corpus.

Congress did not intend § 2255 to restrict access to habeas corpus. Originally,
prisoners’ first habeas petitions were filed under § 2241 in the district of
confinement, which yielded administrative problems and led to the enactment of
§ 2255 “to make postconviction proceedings more efficient.” Boumediene, 553 U.S.
at 775. Section 2255 “channels collateral attacks by federal prisoners to the
sentencing court (rather than to the court in the district of confinement) so that they
can be addressed more efficiently.” In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 332 (citation omitted).
Therefore, § 2255 “afford[s] federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal
habeas corpus.” Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974).
Congress’s intent to make habeas more efficient, while preserving the writ’s
remedial scope, is confirmed by § 2255’s inclusion of “a saving clause, providing
that a writ of habeas corpus would be available if the alternative process proved
inadequate or ineffective.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776; see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)
(permitting an application for writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 if “the remedy by
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [a prisoner’s] detention”).
Congress’s enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
17
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added to § 2255 the gatekeeping provisions that are now preventing Mr. Bell from
seeking relief, but also preserved and recodified the savings clause as § 2255(e). As
this Court has observed, § 2255’s savings clause “arguably saves § 2255 from
unconstitutionally suspending habeas corpus” by preserving the traditional habeas
remedy if the statutory process proves inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of a prisoners’ detention. Lester, 909 F.3d at 711; see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at
776 (“The Court placed explicit reliance upon [the savings clause] in upholding
[§ 2255] against constitutional challenges.”); United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240,
271 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting) (“History therefore confirms that
Congress meant for the writ of habeas corpus to remain unabridged even in the face
of some limits on collateral review found in § 2255, and that the savings clause plays
a distinct and crucial role within the statute. And of course we cannot forget that,
ultimately, the writ of habeas corpus is an equitable remedy.”).
In short, interpreting § 2255 together with its savings clause as preserving preexisting rights of prisoners to challenge detentions through traditional habeas is
consistent with Congress’s intent. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219 (“Nowhere in the
history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of
collateral attack upon their convictions.”).
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This Court’s Precedents Allow Mr. Bell To Pursue Relief Under
§ 2241.

This Court’s precedents establish a clear avenue for Mr. Bell and others in a
similar position to invoke § 2255’s savings clause and pursue a habeas claim under
§ 2241. This Court has interpreted the savings clause to allow federal prisoners to
pursue habeas claims under § 2241 to challenge unlawful sentences when such
challenges would otherwise be precluded by § 2255. See, e.g., Young, 982 F.3d at
917–19 (4th Cir. 2020); Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429.
Appellant’s Brief fully explains why Mr. Bell is entitled to relief under this
Court’s precedent in Wheeler and Young. In light of the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Johnson and Welch, Mr. Bell’s current sentence is plainly unconstitutional and
requires correction. In Wheeler, the Fourth Circuit established a four-part test to
determine when a habeas petitioner may invoke § 2255’s savings clause to “test the
legality of his detention” via a § 2241 petition because § 2255 “is inadequate or
ineffective.” Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429. At issue in Mr. Bell’s appeal is Wheeler’s
second prong, which asks whether, after the petitioner’s direct appeal and first
§ 2255 motion, “settled substantive law” of the Fourth Circuit or Supreme Court
changed. Id. Young establishes that the Fourth Circuit can evaluate the legal
landscape and recognize a change in law that dictates a change in its precedent
during its application of the Wheeler test. 982 F.3d at 919. Similarly here, although
the district court was not permitted to recognize the clear change in settled
19
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substantive law that necessarily follows from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Johnson, the Fourth Circuit faces no such constraint and now can (and should) reach
the straightforward conclusion that Mr. Bell’s sentence was imposed in violation of
the Constitution.
If the Court were for some reason to cabin its application of Wheeler and
Young such that they would not permit Mr. Bell to invoke § 2255’s savings clause
to obtain a remedy though § 2241, then the Court would have to contend with the
Suspension Clause.
C.

If § 2255’s Savings Clause Does Not Provide An Avenue For Mr.
Bell To Pursue Habeas Relief, § 2255 Would Violate The
Suspension Clause.

As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s Boumediene decision indicates that,
to the extent the other portions of § 2255 do not allow for review, no gap should
exist between claims subject to § 2255’s savings clause and claims protected by the
Suspension Clause. In other words, habeas claims cognizable before Congress’s
enactment of § 2255 must be cognizable under either § 2255 or § 2241 (by way of
§ 2255’s savings clause), or else § 2255 violates the Suspension Clause. As the Court
has recognized, failure to interpret § 2255’s savings clause that way would raise
“serious question[s] about the constitutionality of [§ 2255].” Boumediene, 553 U.S.
at 776 (quoting Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
20
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While some of this Court’s cases suggest that § 2255’s savings clause should
be applied narrowly, none suggest the Court would fail to apply the savings clause
in the circumstances presented here. In Lester, this Court noted that the savings
clause “should provide only the tightest alleyway to relief,” 909 F.3d at 716, and in
In re Jones, the Court suggested § 2255 could be considered inadequate under
“limited circumstances,” 226 F.3d at 333. This Court is correct to the extent it means
§ 2255’s savings clause should not be invoked without carefully considering
whether the relief at issue could be pursued under § 2255. But in both cases, this
Court nevertheless found the savings clause’s requirements met and allowed
petitioners to test the legality of their detention under § 2241. This Court has also
stated that “[its] savings clause tests, including Wheeler, do not permit
‘constitutional claims.’” Slusser v. Vereen, No. 19-7482, 2022 WL 2089023, at *4
(4th Cir. June 10, 2022) (quoting Farkas v. Butner, 972 F.3d 548, 559 (4th Cir.
2020)). But as Appellant observes, those statements related to constitutional claims
that would otherwise pass (and in Slusser, had previously passed) through the
gatekeeping provisions of § 2255, so § 2255 was adequate to test the legality of the
challenged detentions. See App. Op. Br. 50. And in dicta in Ham v. Breckon, this
Court described its action in Young as “drastic” and said the approach should be used
“sparingly.” Ham, 994 F.3d 682, 695 n.9 (4th Cir. 2021). But Ham still recognized
that it is appropriate to establish a change in substantive law where “a change in
21
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Supreme Court precedent necessarily dictates a change in [the Circuit’s] law,” as
was the case in Young. Id. Those are the circumstances presented by Mr. Bell’s
petition.
If Mr. Bell is precluded from seeking habeas relief for his fundamentally
defective sentence under the savings clause, the purpose of traditional habeas to
remedy such defects “would remain unfulfilled,” Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 428, and this
Court would be interpreting § 2255 to violate the Suspension Clause. As Appellant
explains, Mr. Bell is precluded from presenting his claim in a § 2255 motion through
no fault of his own. (Ironically, § 2255 treats his claim as premature, even though he
will never be in a position to pursue it under § 2255. See App. Op. Br. 41–42.) Mr.
Bell’s challenge to his detention falls squarely within the protections provided by
habeas corpus before Congress enacted § 2255. He seeks what Boumediene reminds
us is the basic privilege of habeas corpus protected by the Suspension Clause: “a
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the
erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at
779 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302). “[T]he Supreme Court has long recognized
a right to traditional habeas corpus relief based on an illegally extended sentence.”
Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 428. Indeed, “the ‘core’ of habeas corpus” includes challenges
to “the duration of [a prisoner’s] sentence.” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643
(2004). Accordingly, if this Court were to interpret § 2255 to preclude Mr. Bell and
22
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similarly situated prisoners from seeking habeas relief to challenge their detention,
§ 2255 would violate the Suspension Clause.
The Suspension Clause violation can also be seen in how § 2255’s preclusion
of Mr. Bell and others from seeking habeas relief would undermine the doctrinal
underpinnings of habeas review. In requiring an unconstitutional sentence to go
unchallenged, § 2255 would be undermining the judiciary’s basic role in preserving
separation of powers and limited government principles enshrined in the
Constitution, see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693, and disabling “the instrument by which
due process could be insisted upon by a citizen illegally imprisoned,” Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 555–56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Mr. Bell’s circumstances cry out for relief. Interpreting § 2255 to preclude
him from seeking habeas review would condemn him to continue serving an unjust
sentence imposed under an unconstitutional statute. Such a result would severely
undermine the integrity, fairness, and credibility of our criminal justice system.
Habeas corpus should be available to prevent such outcomes, and precluding access
to the writ of habeas corpus in this case would violate the Suspension Clause.
CONCLUSION
Section 2255’s habeas substitute procedures are inadequate and ineffective to
test the legality of Mr. Bell’s detention. Accordingly, the savings clause Congress
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provided in § 2255(e) and the Suspension Clause ensure that a petition under § 2241
is available for Mr. Bell to challenge his unconstitutional sentence.

DATED: June 21, 2022
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